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Cloud-based applicationsAbstract Homomorphic encryption system (HES) schemes are anticipated to play a significant
role in cloud-based applications. Moving to cloud-based storage and analytic services securely
are two of the most important advantages of HES. Several HES schemes have been recently
proposed. However, the majority of them either have limited capabilities or are impractical in
real-world applications. Various HES schemes provide the ability to perform computations for
statistical analysis (e.g. average, mean and variance) on encrypted data. Domingo-Ferrer is one
scheme that has privacy homomorphism properties to perform the basic mathematical operations
(addition, subtraction and multiplication) in a convenient and secure way. However, it works only
in the positive numbers’ range which is considered as a limitation because several applications
require both positive and negative ranges in which to work, especially those that have to implement
analytical services in cloud computing. In this paper, we extend Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme to be
able to perform arithmetic operations for both positive and negative numbers. We also propose
using a lightweight data aggregation function to compute both maximum and minimum values
of the aggregated data that works for both positive and negative numbers.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The essential idea behind the efforts to involve homomorphic
encryption system (HES) techniques in practical applications is
to employ the advantages of cloud computing services and
resources, as these techniques provide a convenient and secure
environment for uploading private information to a cloud.
HES has existed since the inception of public key cryptogra-
phy. Examples of HES include Rivest et al. (1978), ElGamal
(1985), Benaloh (1994) and Paillier (1999), to name a few.
However, these are somewhat homomorphic encryption sys-
tems (SHES), meaning they only support either addition or
28 A. Alabdulatif, M. Kaosarmultiplication, not both. A number of these schemes fail to be
appropriate for practical applications because they are often
inefficient and are unable to perform many required arithmetic
operations to build useful applications in cloud environments.
A fully homomorphic encryption system (FHES) would
support several operations simultaneously. This was a problem
until the breakthrough result of Gentry (2009), which is based
on the properties of ideal lattices (Bayer-Fluckiger, 2002). This
scheme is still quite impractical for real-life applications
because of its limitations in arithmetic operations, time con-
sumption and the amount of resources that are required for
computations. Shortly after, a FHES was introduced that used
only elementary arithmetic operations (Van Dijk et al., 2010).
While this modified scheme reduced the complexity of a fully
homomorphic encryption process by allowing it to be
described in simple terms, it is still complex enough to be use-
ful in any real-life applications. The aforementioned FHES
schemes and other similar schemes, such as Gentry (2009,
2010), have a common drawback, which includes computa-
tional overhead in terms of efficiency and execution time. This
led to the conclusion that these schemes are ineffective for real-
life applications, especially in a cloud-based environment.
The Domingo-Ferrer encryption scheme (Domingo-Ferrer,
2002) is considered a lightweight scheme that has the ability to
perform various arithmetic computations in a secure manner
based on homomorphic properties, and it can be a possible
candidate in various practical cloud-based applications. We
believe that the Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative
privacy homomorphism scheme (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) is
one of the most applicable HESs that can perform main basic
arithmetic operations, which include addition, subtraction and
multiplication. This is done in appropriate and secure ways
such as through statistical analysis services in wire and wireless
sensor networks (WSN), where aggregated data are analysed
using aggregation functions. Indeed, it has a convenient
encryption/decryption mechanism, which helps with use in
various cloud-based applications (see Fig. 1).
We are working to adapt Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme
(Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) to be able to operate within practical
applications in cloud-based environments by improving their
capabilities to encompass a wider range of arithmetic opera-
tions, which leads to increased opportunities to move many
of the existing applications to the cloud. In this paper, we high-
light and address the following issues:Figure 1 Numerous applications can delegate the An ability to involve a negative number’s range in
Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002). We
extend Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme to be able to perform
arithmetic operations in both positive and negative num-
bers. We reorganise encryption/decryption parameters in a
way that helps to carry out numbers’ signs. This contribu-
tion allows the deployment of many applications that
require both positive and negative ranges in cloud-based
environments in a secure manner. In real-life situations,
we most often think of negative numbers when we speak
of real-world applications, such as military navigation sys-
tems, human health monitoring systems and many others.
We have to consider how they can be manipulated in a
secure and efficient way, especially those applications that
involve sensitive and private data. A negative number’s
range on encrypted data with homomorphism properties
can contribute to securing many aggregation functions that
use a negative number range as an essential part of their
computations.
 According to the previous contribution, we introduce an
aggregation function to compute maximum and minimum
values among aggregated data based on both positive and
negative number ranges. This aggregation function is based
on Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy
homomorphism scheme. We improve an idea that is shown
in Ertaul and Kedlaya (2007). This is based on Domingo-
Ferrer’s scheme of finding maximum and minimum values
among aggregated values through an ability to combine
the two processes to find maximum and minimum in a sin-
gle process rather than complete them separately. This is a
result of taking advantage of both positive and negative
number ranges instead of working in a positive numbers
range only. This aggregation function is compatible to be
applied to the cloud because of its ability to find maximum
and minimum values among a set of values in their
encrypted form without the need to reveal any information
during the implementation of this function.
We revisit previous work and background concepts in Sec-
tion 2. The proposed extended scheme is described in Section 3.
In Section 4, we illustrate arithmetic and logical operations
and their specifications based on the proposed scheme. We pre-
sent implementation details and performance analysis in Sec-
tion 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.ir data processing to the cloud based on HES.
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In this section, we provide an overview of secure computation
schemes and describe specifications of Domingo-Ferrer’s addi-
tive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism scheme.
2.1. Secure computation operations
Secure computation allows a single or multiparty to execute
specific functions on their inputs and return the result without
revealing any private information to other parties. In practical-
ity, several applications must have single or multiparty compu-
tations, especially those applications that perform statistical
analysis computations shared by distributed multiparties,
and the main concern with these applications is preserving
data privacy. Secure multiparty computation (SMC)
(Prabhakaran and Sahai, 2013), considered an important part
of cryptography concepts, is directly involved in these types of
applications. Atallah and Blanton (2013) illustrate an overveiw
of some techniques for computation outsourcing. However,
these techniques have some limitations in terms of computa-
tion capabilities that fail to achieve secure analysis services
requirements. In general, there are two common techniques
for multiparty computations: garbled circuits, such as Yao
(1986), and secret sharing, such as Chaum et al. (1988) and
Ben-Or et al. (1988). These techniques are involved in many
existing multiparty computation protocols. However, we focus
on SMCs that are based on HES techniques.
Recently, several FHES schemes, such as Gentry (2009),
Van Dijk et al. (2010) and Lo´pez-Alt et al. (2012), and SHES
schemes, such as Damga˚rd et al. (2012), have been introduced
as efficient solutions compared to other techniques in the sense
of less interaction required between different parties. However,
they have either of the following two disadvantages: a lack of
efficiency caused by overhead computations in both encryption
and decryption processes, which make them impractical for
real-world applications, or an inability to perform various
functions on both positive and negative numbers that are
required as part of many real-world applications, especially
in statistical analysis applications.
Upon what has been previously mentioned, SMCs should
maintain two main principles: an efficiency in both encryption
and decryption processes and an ability to execute various func-
tions as required. We believe that Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme
(Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) is one of the most efficient schemes
to perform at least main basic operations (addition, subtraction
and multiplication) based on homomorphism properties. These
operations give an opportunity to execute more complex oper-
ations based on targeted application requirements.
2.2. Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy
homomorphism scheme
Domingo-Ferrer introduced in Domingo-Ferrer (2002) an
HES that has the ability to perform main basic arithmetic
operations (addition, subtraction and multiplications) in a
secure and convenient manner. Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme is
classified as a symmetric-key encryption scheme and is proven
secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (Wagner, 2003). This
scheme does not have the ability to carry numbers’ signs mean-
ing that it cannot distinguish between positive and negativenumbers’ ranges, which is considered an important issue, espe-
cially in the case of applying this scheme to applications that
use a negative number range as a part of their functionalities.
A brief description of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme in (First
appendix).
From our observation, we conclude that this scheme can
perform operations on encrypted data without considering
sign, which limits the scheme’s abilities because most real-
world applications have to carry a value’s sign in their imple-
mentation. Accordingly, we attempt to determine a solution
for this issue by performing experiments on encryption/decryp-
tion parameters, including adjusting these parameters in such a
way that it would support carrying a value’s sign. This allows
for an extension of this scheme to be appropriate for many
real-life applications.
3. Proposed secure computations
In the section, we describe our proposed aim to extend
Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) to encom-
pass the negative numbers’ range through the ability to carry
a number’s signs.
The essential contribution of this paper relies on restructur-
ing the parameters of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme in such a way
that it is collaborative to carry the sign of number. The new
configuration assists in performing self or in performing com-
putations in a remote, untrusted third party with the advantage
of having both positive and negative number ranges. In this
paper, we use similar notations as shown in Domingo-Ferrer
(2002), for more explicit and easy observations.3.1. Keys and parameters
Public parameters m and d are two public parameters where the
former is a large integer with many divisors, the latter is a
small integer and d > 2.
Private parameters m0 and r. The former is a small divisor
of m and m0 > 1. m0 should be large enough to involve the
legitimate computation range to avoid overflow, as received
values may fall outside that range. The latter is r 2 Zm, as long
as r1 modulus m exists. We have an additional secret param-
eter l, which determines the legible range that allows us to
carry numbers’ signs. We choose l based on the m parameter,
as follows:
l ¼ 
m0
2
  1  m0
2
 
if m0 is even
 m01
2
  1  m01
2
  
if m0 is odd
(
For instance, we can choose m ¼ 14, which is considered an
even number the legitimate range l ¼ ½6; 7. The parameter l
is involved in the encryption process in Eq. (1). This allows
us to generate random numbers in a specific range l, which
helps to distinguish between negative and positive numbers.
Precisely, each received value x is converted to different ran-
dom small values based on Eq. (1), and the legitimate range
l is used to keep the scope of the generated random values in
a manner that allows tracking of both positive and negative
numbers’ ranges. In Fig. 2, we illustrate that our scheme has
the ability to carry out numbers’ signs or negative numbers
precisely, which is not applicable based on Domingo-Ferrer’s
scheme.
Figure 2 An example of how the scope of our proposed scheme is different from that of Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme under a given
specification.
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We build up encryption/decryption processes in such a way
that our target of carrying numbers’ signs is achieved. In the
following demonstration, we assume that the public parameter
d ¼ 2.
3.2.1. Encryption process
The encryption process is performed through randomly split-
ting a selected value a 2 Zm0 into small secret values
ða1; a2 . . . ; adÞ, where d determines a tuple size for each splitted
value as previously mentioned. The splitting process must sat-
isfy the following:
a ¼
X2
i¼1
ai mod m
0 where ai 2 Zm ð1Þ
based on that, we must generate two random values a and b to
satisfy Eq. (4) as follows:
1. Choose a random value a1 from the legitimate range l.
2. Choose a random value a2 based on three values, which are
a1, a received value a and a secret parameter m, as shown in
the following equation:
a2 ¼ mþ a a1 ð2ÞEq. (5) is extensible based on the value of the parameter d,
which determines the number of random values that are
required to be generated. After that, the actual encryption pro-
cess is performed as follows:
EkðaÞ ¼ ða1  r1 mod m; a2  r2 mod mÞ ð3Þ
At the end of the encryption process, a tuple of encrypted
values is used to represent its plaintext value in encrypted
form, and it can be used to perform arithmetic operations with
other encrypted tuples. In Algorithm 1, we illustrate the
encryption process procedure in more detail.3.2.2. Decryption process
The decryption process is performed through calculating a sca-
lar product of the, i-th element in a tuple by r1 mod m to
retrieve ai mod m, as follows:
ða1r1 mod m; a2r2 mod mÞ ð4ÞAlgorithm 1. Encryption process
Require: m, d, m
0
, r, a tuple z and
a a received value
Ensure: d 2; m0 > 1; r1 mod m exists; ð0; 0Þ  z
if m0 is even then
l½  ¼  m02
  1  m02 
a1 ¼ l½i // Pick a random element i of an array l½ 
a2 ¼ mþ a a1
z ¼ EkðaÞ ¼ ða1r mod m; a2r2 modÞ ¼ ðz1; z2Þ
else {m0 is odd}
l½  ¼  m012
  1 ; m012  
a1 ¼ l½i // Pick a random element i of an array l½ 
a2 ¼ mþ a a1
z ¼ EkðaÞ ¼ ða1r mod m; a2r2 modÞ ¼ ðz1; z2Þ
//ðz1; z2Þ an encrypted result
end if
Then, all elements in a resulted tuple are added
through recalling Eq. (4) to retrieve an original value of a, as
follows:
a ¼
X2
i¼1
ai mod m
0 ð1Þ
All arithmetic operations on encrypted data are carried out
over ðZmÞd at an unclassified level. Algorithm 2 represents the
decryption process, which is essentially the reverse of the
encryption process.
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Require: m; m0; r1, an encrypted tuple a and a dimension of the
tuple a ¼ d
Ensure: r1 mod m exists; ða1; . . . ; adÞ  a;
ðð0Þ1; . . . ; ð0ÞdÞ  z sum 0; result 0
z ¼ ða1  r1 mod m; a2  r2 mod m; . . . ; ad  rd mod mÞ
z ¼ ðz1; z2; . . . ; zdÞ
sum ¼Pdi1zi
result ¼ sum mod m0 // a plaintext result
// The result is mapped based on l range to get the exact
result.
We describe a numerical example to illustrate the idea
behind our proposed scheme in more detail though concentrat-
ing on the computations that show how negative numbers’
ranges can be processed based on the proposed scheme. In this
example, we choose public and private parameters, as follows:
Public parameters: m is the public modulus and it is chosen
to be m ¼ 28. We choose d ¼ 2.
private parameters: We choose r ¼ 3 and m0 ¼ 14 to be the
secret key. We make sure r1 mod m exists, which is r1 ¼ 19 in
this case. Since we chose m? ¼ 14, which is considered an even
number, the legitimate range will be l ¼ ½6; 7. The formal
interpretation of the legitimate range l in this example is con-
sidered as dividing the decrypted results into two ranges of
numbers, positive and negative, as follows:
1. If the final decrypted result is in the range between [0,7], the
final plaintext result remains the same in the sense that any
number in this range with modulus m0 has the same value.
2. If the final decrypted result is in the range between [-6 , -1],
the final plaintext result with modulus m0 is interpreted as
follows:
ð13Þ ! ð1Þ; ð12Þ ! ð2Þ; ð11Þ ! ð3Þ
ð10Þ ! ð4Þ; ð9Þ ! ð5Þ; ð8Þ ! ð6Þ
Fig. 3 shows how a negative number range is deduced based
on a legitimate range lthat is considered a part of the security
parameters.
We perform two addition operations combined with a
single multiplication operation in the following formula,Figure 3 A transformation process for a negative number range
based on the example specifications.ðx1 þ x2Þx3 where x1 ¼ 1; x2 ¼ 4 and x3 ¼ 2. The first stage
is to encrypt all the plaintext values by recalling both Eqs. (1)
and (2), respectively, for each single plaintext value.
Generate random value of x1 ¼ 1! ð6; 21Þ
Generate random value of x2 ¼ 4! ð4; 6Þ
Generate random value of x3 ¼ 2! ð3; 13Þ
The next step is encrypting all plaintext values by utilising
Eq. (2) based on random values that are generated through
Eq. (1).
Eðx1Þ ¼ ðð6 3Þ mod 28þ ð21 9Þ mod 28Þ ¼ ð18; 21Þ
Eðx2Þ ¼ ðð4 3Þ mod 28þ ð6 9Þ mod 28Þ ¼ ð12; 26Þ
Eðx3Þ ¼ ðð3 3Þ mod 28þ ð13 9Þ mod 28Þ ¼ ð9; 5Þ
All previous steps are processed in a secure environment,
which is considered as a classified level. Now, we implement
the formula ðx1 þ x2Þx4 on encrypted data at an unclassified
level, such as a cloud-based environment. We add (x1 þ x2)
to the encrypted forms, as follows:
X2
i¼1
EðxiÞ ¼ ð18þ 12 mod 28; 21þ 26 mod 28Þ ¼ ð6; 19Þ
Then, we multiply Eðx3Þ with the addition results ð6; 19Þ,
ð6;19ÞEðx4Þ¼ ð6;19Þð9;5Þ
¼ ð0;69mod 28;ð65þ199Þmod 28;195mod 28Þ
¼ ð0;26;1;11Þ
Finally, the result is returned to a classified level to perform
the decryption process based on Eq. (3) to obtain the plaintext
result, as follows:
ð0 r1 modm;26 r2 modm;1 r3 modm;11 r4 modmÞ
¼ ð019mod 28;26192 mod 28;1193 mod 28;
11194 mod 28Þ
¼ ð0;6;27;15Þ
The final step in the decryption process is adding all ele-
ments in the resulted tuple over Zm0 to get 36 mod 14 ¼ 8.
In the same classified level, the final result transformed to
the new positive and negative ranges based on the legitimate
range l (see Fig. 2). Therefore, the final result is ð6Þ, which
is the correct result if we perform the same operations on
plaintext values.
We demonstrate this example to state that our proposed
scheme has the ability to extend Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme
through carrying out numbers’ signs. Accordingly, we propose
an aggregation function to compute maximum and minimum
values among aggregated data based on our contribution that
relies on both positive and negative numbers’ ranges. This
function combines the two processes to find maximum and
minimum values in a single process rather than completing
them separately, as in Ertaul and Kedlaya (2007).
4. Arithmetic and logical operations
In this section, we describe the specifications of arithmetic and
logical operations, based on the proposed scheme, through
algorithms that show the operational transactions in detail.
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minimum function for the aggregated data. This function relies
on additive homomorphic property to find both maximum and
minimum values among aggregated data. We employed our
contribution to reduce the number of operations that are
required to perform this function in Ertaul and Kedlaya
(2007) by obtaining the benefits of a negative number’s range.
4.1. Addition and subtraction operations
As previously illustrated, our scheme has the ability to perform
both addition and subtraction operations in such a way that
can carry numbers’ signs. This involves both positive and
negative numbers’ ranges. Algorithm 3 represents the general
steps to perform a specific encrypted computation for addition
and subtraction.
Algorithm 3. Addition and subtraction operations
Require: m, (an addition or subtraction operation ),
a and b (encrypted values), a tuple z
Ensure: ða1; a2Þ  a ðb1; b2Þ  b; ð0; 0Þ  z
z ¼ ða1  b1 mod m; a2  b2 mod mÞ
z ¼ ðz1; z2Þ // zn  ðan  bnÞ
// a tuple z is an encrypted operation result4.2. Multiplication operation
We designed the multiplication operation in our scheme to
have the ability to work in a negative numbers’ range. In Algo-
rithm 4, encrypted multiplication steps are shown in detail.
Algorithm 4. Multiplication operation
Require: m, (a multiplication operation ),
a and b (encrypted values), a tuple z
Ensure: ða1; a2Þ  a ; ðb1; b2Þ  b; ð0; 0; 0; 0Þ  z
z ¼ ½0; a1  b1 mod m; ða1  b2 þ a2  b1Þ mod m;
a2  b2 mod m // carried as polynomials
z ¼ ½0; z1; z2; z3; z4
// a tuple z is an encrypted operation result
The encrypted division operations are carried out in a
rational format, such that EðaÞ=EðbÞ because the polynomials
are not considered as a field but a ring.4.3. Maximum/minimum function
A proposed maximum/minimum function applies to an
existing scheme (Yokoo and Suzuki, 2002) as a part of its
operations over aggregated data.We propose necessary modifi-
cations to this technique to accommodate negative numbers.
Let’s say there are two parameters: a weight w and dimension
n that are chosen such that ð1  w  nÞ and n is a large enough
value to represent the largest value that can be received from
outside sources in this scheme. We utilise a new parameter
n to represent a negative dimension of this scheme such that
ðn  w  0Þ and ð0  w  nÞ. Each received weight w is
classified and encrypted as follows:w ¼
Case 1 : The weight w is a positive value
Case 2 : The weight w is zero
Case 3 : The weightw is a negative value
8><
>:
Case 1: The weight w is located in a positive numbers’
range. Therefore, the encryption process is as follows:
EðwÞ ¼ Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
;EðzÞ; . . . ;EðzÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
w
;Eð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
nw
ð5Þ
where EðwÞ is an encrypted value of received weight, EðzÞ is a
random encrypted value z that is not equal to 0 and Eð0Þ is the
encrypted value of 0. These parameters are uniform in all the
mentioned three cases. In this case, Eð0Þ is assigned to all num-
bers in the negative range from 1 up to n.
Case 2: The weight w is zero. Therefore, the encryption pro-
cess is as follows:
EðwÞ ¼ Eð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ};
Negative range
Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ};
0
Eð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive range
ð6Þ
In this case, Eð0Þ is assigned to numbers in both positive
and negative ranges from 1 up to n and from 1 up to n.
Case 3: The weight w is located in a negative numbers’
range. Therefore, the encryption process is as follows:
EðwÞ ¼ Eð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ;|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
nw
EðzÞ; . . . ;EðzÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ};
w
Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
ð7Þ
In this case, Eð0Þ is assigned to all numbers in the positive
range from 1 up to n.
Each received weight is transformed into a set of encrypted
random non-zero and zero values that are represented in a
specific range ðn; nÞ based on previous mention classification.
Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme Domingo-Ferrer, 2002 is employed
to perform the encryption process for random values EðzÞ to
be used for the transformation process because it has the abil-
ity to achieve an additive field operation on encrypted data. A
random value z is chosen such that z r < m0, where r is a
number of the expected weights that are passed to the function
and z–0. The next stage after passing all received weights to
question (5)(6)(7) based on their classification is to perform
additive field operations to find both maximum and minimum
values among all weights. We calculate both maximum and
minimum values in a single process based on the following
formula:
a ¼
Xi¼r
i¼1
ðEi;jðxjÞ;Ei;jþ1ðxjþ1Þ; . . . ;Ei;nðxnÞÞ ð8Þ
where r is the number of passed weights to the function and
j ¼ n. Eq. (8) covers both negative and positive ranges for
each transformed weight in a set r. Each encrypted value
Ei;jðxjÞ is either random value –0 or 0.
The final stage after performing additive homomorphic
encryption is the decryption process in a classified secure level
from a positive range ðEi;nðxnÞÞ to a negative range
ðEi;nðxnÞÞ, from right to left, to find a maximum value of a
set r and in the reverse mean from the negative range
ðEi;nðxnÞÞ to ðEi;nðxnÞÞ, from left to right is used to find a
minimum value of a set r. The decryption process is performed
in both ranges in parallel mean, and it continues until non-zero
values are detected during this process. Each encrypted value
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a set r. The given parameter j is utilised to determine a maxi-
mum or minimum value based on the first non-zero values that
are detected during the decryption process of both negative
and positive ranges.
We accentuate the main steps to perform maximum/mini-
mum function in Algorithms 5–7. This function consists of
two main stages: generating random encrypted values which
occur in a classified secure level, and encrypting computations,
which occur in an unclassified public level.
We assume that random encrypted values are generated
based on algorithms in the previous section. Algorithm 5
shows the distribution process of random encrypted data
based on a range of received data.
Algorithm 5. Distribution of random encrypted values process
Require: a(a received value) ; ½n; n (legitimate range),
R½ (random encrypted values) ; t½ 
Ensure: t½   Pni¼nt½xi ¼ 0
if a > 0 thenPa
i¼1t½xi ¼ R½i // i is an element in R½ Pn
i¼aþ1t½xi ¼ 0// the rest of positive range set to zeroP0
i¼nt½xi ¼ 0 // all negative range set to zero
else if a < 0 thenPa
i¼1t½xi ¼ R½i // i is an element in R½ Pn
i¼a1t½xi ¼ 0// the rest of negative range set to zeroPn
i¼0t½xi ¼ 0 // All positive range set to zero
else {a = 0}
t½0 ¼ 0// i is an element in R½ Pn
i¼1t½xi ¼ 0// the positive range set to zeroP1
i¼nt½xi ¼ 0 // All negative range set to zero
end if
In Algorithms 6 and 7, additive field operations are per-
formed for all arrays where we assume 5 arrays in this case
for simplicity. They keep random encrypted and zero values
and obtain a new array after performing additive field oper-
ations. The resulting array is decrypted in a classified secure
level to obtain maximum and minimum values.
Algorithm 6. Find maximum value
Require: Ti;5½  (a set of arrays), ½1; n (legitimate range) Result[ ],
x, count1, count2, Max, Min
Ensure:
Pn
i¼1Result½xi ¼ 0;x 0; count1  n;Max 0
for j :¼ 1 to n step 1 do
for i = 1 to 5 step 1 do
Resultj½  Resultj½ þ Ti;j½
end for
end for
for j :¼ n to 1 step -1 do
x ¼ decryptðResult½jÞ
if x = 0 then
count1 ¼ count1  1
else {}
break;
end if
end for
Max count1Algorithm 7. Find minimum value
Require: Ti;5½  (a set of arrays), ½n; 0 (legitimate range),
Result½ ;x; count2;Min
Ensure:
P0
i¼nResult½xi ¼ 0;x 0; count2  n;Min 0
for j :¼ -n to 0 step 1 do
for i = 1 to 5 step 1 do
Resultj½  Resultj½ þ Ti;j½
end for
end for
for j :¼ -n to 1 step 1 do
x ¼ decryptðResult½jÞ
if x = 0 then
count2 ¼ count2 þ 1
else {}
break;
end if
end for
Min count1
We describe a numerical example to disclose the idea
behind maximum/minimum function in more detail. We apply
the same parameters of the previous example in encryption/
decryption processes, and we assume the expected range
ðn; nÞ is ð6; 6Þ and r ¼ 4 such that we have
ðr1; r2; r3; r4Þ ¼ ð3;2; 1; 0Þ, based on each weight ri being pro-
cessed, as follows:
r1 ¼ 3 is considered in a positive numbers’ range. We trans-
form r1 by calling Eq. (5):
Eð3Þ ¼ E1;0ð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
0
;E1;1ðz1Þ;E1;2ðz2Þ;E1;3ðz3Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
3
;E1;4ð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ1;6|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
63
All elements in the negative numbers’ range ð6; 1Þ are
set to encrypted values of zero (E1;jð0Þ).
r2 ¼ 2 is considered to be in a negative numbers’ range.
We transform r2 by calling Eq. (7):
Eð2Þ ¼ E2;6ð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ2;3|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
6ð2Þ
E2;2ðz2Þ;E2;1ðz1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
2
;E2;0ð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
0
All elements in the positive numbers’ range ð1; 6Þ are set to
encrypted values of zero (E2;jð0Þ).
r3 ¼ 1 is considered to be in a positive numbers’ range. We
transform r3 by calling Eq. (5):
Eð1Þ ¼ E3;0ð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ};
0
E3;1ðz1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ};
1
E3;2ð0Þ;E3;3ð0Þ; . . . ;Eð0Þ3;6|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
61
All elements in the negative numbers’ range ð6; 1Þ are
set to encrypted values of zero (E3;jð0Þ).
r4 ¼ 0 is considered to be zero. We transform r4 by calling
Eq. (6):
Eð0Þ ¼ E4;6ð0Þ; . . . ;E4;1ð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Negative range
;E4;0ð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
0
;E4;1ð0Þ; . . . ;E4;6ð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive range
All elements in both the positive and negative numbers’
ranges ð1; 6Þ and ð6; 1Þ are set to encrypted values of zero
(E4;jð0Þ).
We generate random values ðz1; z2; z3; z4; z5Þ to encrypt them
under Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme with the same previous speci-
fications. The random values are used for the transformation
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assume the values of ðz1; z2; z3; z4; z5Þ are ð3; 1; 2; 0; 0Þ, respec-
tively. The encryption process for these random values is per-
formed as follows:
Eðz1Þ ¼ Eð3Þ ¼ Eð1; 18Þ ¼ Eð3; 22Þ
Eðz2Þ ¼ Eð1Þ ¼ Eð5; 10Þ ¼ Eð15; 6Þ
Eðz3Þ ¼ Eð2Þ ¼ Eð6; 10Þ ¼ Eð18; 6Þ
Eðz4Þ ¼ Eð0Þ ¼ Eð6; 20Þ ¼ Eð18; 12Þ
Eðz5Þ ¼ Eð0Þ ¼ Eð1; 13Þ ¼ Eð3; 5Þ
We can encrypt extra zero values zi based on Domingo-
Ferrer’s scheme to make both transformation and additive
homomorphic operations more random and secure. Next,
these encrypted values are utilised to fill non-zero values
EðzÞ randomly during the transformation process. The first
value r1 ¼ 3 is transformed as follows:
S1 ¼ Eð3Þ ¼ Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
;Eð2Þ;Eð1Þ;Eð3Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
3
;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
63
S1 ¼ Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
;Eð18; 6Þ;Eð15; 6Þ;Eð3; 22Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
3
;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
63
Each Eð0Þ is filled by either z4 or z5 randomly, and all ele-
ments in the negative numbers’ range ð6; 1Þ are set to
encrypted values of zero (Eð0Þ). The next received value is
r2 ¼ 2,
S2 ¼ Eð2Þ ¼ Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
6ð2Þ
;Eð1Þ;Eð3Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
2
; Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
S2 ¼ Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
6ð2Þ
;Eð15; 6Þ;Eð3; 22Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
2
; Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
Each Eð0Þ is randomly filled by either z4 or z5 and all ele-
ments in the positive numbers’ range ð1; 6Þ are set to encrypted
values of zero (Eð0Þ). The next received value is r3 ¼ 1,
S3 ¼ Eð1Þ ¼ Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
; Eð2Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
1
;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
61
S3 ¼ Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
;Eð18; 6Þ;Eð15; 6Þ;Eð3; 22Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
3
;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
63
Each Eð0Þ is randomly filled by either z4 or z5 and all ele-
ments in the negative numbers’ range ð6; 1Þ are set to
encrypted values of zero (Eð0Þ). The last received value is r4 ¼ 0,S4 ¼ Eð0Þ ¼ Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Negative rangeð60Þ
; Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive rangeð60ÞEach Eð0Þ is randomly filled by either z4 or z5. The next stage
is performing additive field operations over ðS1;S2;S3;S4Þ.
After performing the additive operation, we have a set of tuples
in both the positive and negative ranges, shown as follows:
First, the negative range of the additive operation result is:
Result1 ¼ Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
negative range
;EðN2Þ;EðN1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
negativerange
; Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0All added tuples’ results in the negative range are zero val-
ues, except N2 and N1 because they are already filled with
non-zero values in S1 and added to zero values in S2;S3 and
S4.
Second, the positive range of the additive operation is:
Result2 ¼ Eð0Þ|ﬄ{zﬄ}
0
;EðN1Þ;EðN2Þ;EðN3Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive range
;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ;Eð0Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive range
All added tuples in the positive range are zero values except
N1;N2;N3 because they are already filled with non-zero values
in S1 and S3, and added to zero values in S2 and S4.
The final stage is performed in a classified secure level,
which includes the decryption process from both directions
from left to right in Result1, which is considered a negative
range decryption and from right to left in Result2, which is
considered a positive range decryption. In Result1, all tuples
are decrypted from j ¼ 6 up to j ¼ 3 to get zero values.
At j ¼ 2, the decrypted result is a non-zero value, therefore
it is considered as a minimum value of all received values.
On the other hand, in Result2, all tuples are decrypted from
j ¼ 6 up to j ¼ 4 to get zero values. At j ¼ 3, the decrypted
result is a non-zero value, so this is considered a maximum
value of all received values. By comparing our proposed func-
tion with an existing function Ertaul and Kedlaya, 2007, we
can conclude that our function reduces the redundancy that
happens when the function Ertaul and Kedlaya, 2007 performs
separate operations to find maximum and minimum values
through combining these in a single operation by using the
negative numbers’ range as a part of finding maximum and
minimum values rather than working in just a positive num-
bers’ range.
5. Implementation and performance analysis
In this section, we describe implementations of the proposed
scheme and its operations. Our code runs on an Intel Core
i5 Processor 2.40 GHz and 4 GB RAM. Java programming
language (Gosling et al., 2005) is used as a convenient frame-
work. Our implementation has the following three main pro-
cesses: (1) an encryption process, which is involved in
generating random values and transformation to tuples fol-
lowed by an actual encryption process; (2) performing
encrypted operations that mainly include addition, subtraction
and multiplication and (3) a decryption process which is the
final stage after finishing the computation process stage.In this paper, we implemented a performance analysis by
identifying the amount of time consumption for both encryp-
tion and decryption processes and operational calculations
based on the scenario of having self-computation process
applications that would be adapted in cloud-based environ-
ments. Table 1 illustrates execution time for the different
numerical operations of self-computation processes, and all
results are shown in millisecond unit.
Table 1 Execution time of self-computation processes.
Process type Encryption Addition Subtraction Multiplication Decryption
Execution time 9:195 102 7:22 102 9:66 102 7:27 102 6:97 102
Table 2 Execution time comparison between Gentry and proposed protocol based on Domingo-Ferrer schemes (unit: milliseconds).
Cryptosystem Encryption Decryption Addition Multiplication Size of data
Gentry’s scheme 8:39 103 7:64 104 4:97 105 7:72 104 Per bit
Proposed protocol based on
(Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme)
9:195 102 6:97 102 7:22 102 7:27 102 Per value (integer or float-point number)
Privacy preserving cloud computation 35It is well-known that there is a trade-off between security
and flexibility in real-world systems. In our protocol, we adapt
a practical homomorphic scheme with other secure mecha-
nisms that ensure the privacy of consumers’ data and perfor-
mance elasticity of provided services. Table 2 illustrates a
performance of execution time for different operations of pro-
posed protocol based on Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme compared
with a well-known homomorphic encryption called Gentry’s
scheme Gentry, 2009.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed some techniques to perform various
arithmetic and comparison operations to ensure secure compu-
tation in several applications running in cloud environments
using Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative privacy
homomorphism scheme. This led to the advantage of moving
applications that require secure computations on both positive
and negative ranges in cloud computing. Moreover, this con-
tribution can be applicable to extend another Domingo-
Ferrer’s scheme named a new privacy homomorphism and
application Ferrer, 1996. According to that, we designed an
aggregation maximum/minimum function based on
Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme that improves the existing scheme
(Ertaul and Kedlaya, 2007) by extending this function to work
in the negative number range and improving the efficiency by
combining the processes of finding maximum and minimum
values in a single process. The performance of the proposed
scheme is quite satisfactory and efficient enough to use in light-
weight applications, and it is convenient to be applied to
cloud-based applications.Appendix A. Domingo-Ferrer’s additive and multiplicative
privacy homomorphism scheme
In Domingo-Ferrer’s scheme, m and d are two public parame-
ters where the former is a large integer with many divisors and
the latter is a small integer and d > 2. Since each single
encrypted value is represented by a tuple, which is a set of
elements, the parameter d represents the number of elements
in each tuple. The secret parameters are m0 and r. The former
is a small divisor of m;m0 > 1 and the latter is r 2 Zm, as long
as r1 modulus m exists. In short, we can consider the secret
key in this scheme as k ¼ ðm0; rÞ. All encryption and
decryption processes are performed in a classified level thatis considered a secure part of this scheme; meanwhile, all arith-
metic operations on encrypted data are performed in an
unclassified level, which is considered a public environment,
such as a cloud-based environment.
The encryption process is performed through randomly
splitting the selected value a 2 Zm0 into small secret values
ða1; a2 . . . ; adÞ, where d determines a tuple size for each splitted
value, as previously mentioned. The splitting process must sat-
isfy the following:
a ¼
Xd
i¼1
ai mod m
0 where ai 2 Zm ð:1Þ
After that,
EkðaÞ ¼ ða1r1 mod m; a2r2 mod m; . . . ; adrd mod mÞ ð:2Þ
At the end of an encryption process, a tuple of encrypted
values is used to represent its plaintext value in encrypted
form, and it can be used to perform arithmetic operations with
other encrypted tuples.
The decryption process is performed through calculating a
scalar product of the, i th element in a tuple by r1 mod m to
retrieve ai mod m as follows:
ða1r1 mod m; a2r2 mod m; . . . ; adrd mod mÞ ð:3Þ
Then, all elements in a resulted tuple are added through
recalling Eq. (1). to retrieve an original value of a as follows:
a ¼
Xd
i¼1
ai mod m
0 ð:1Þ
All arithmetic operations on encrypted data are carried out
over ðZmÞd at an unclassified level. We demonstrate a simple
numerical example of this scheme below to clarify both encryp-
tion/decryption processes and arithmetic computations on
encrypted data, as well. In this example, we choose public
and private parameters, as follows:
Public parameters: m is the public modulus and it is chosen
to be m ¼ 28. We choose d ¼ 2, which represents a number of
elements in a single tuple. For simplicity, it is recommended to
be d > 2 in worst case for security reasons.
Private parameters: We choose r ¼ 3 and m0 ¼ 7 to be the
secret key. We make sure r1 mod m exists, which is
r1 ¼ 19 in this case.
We use a formula to perform two addition operations com-
bined with a single multiplication operation, namely
ðx1 þ x2Þx3 where x1 ¼ 2; x2 ¼ 1 and x3 ¼ 0. The first stage
36 A. Alabdulatif, M. Kaosaris to encrypt all these plaintext values by recalling both Eqs. (1)
and (2) respectively, for each a single plaintext value.
Generate random value of x1 ¼ 2!ð0; 9Þ
Generate random value of x2 ¼ 1!ð1; 7Þ
Generate random value of x3 ¼ 0!ð2; 5Þ
The next step is encrypting all plaintext values by utilising
Eq. (2) based on random values that are generated through
Eq. (1).
Eðx1Þ ¼ ðð0 3Þ mod 28; ð9 9Þ mod 28Þ ¼ ð0; 25Þ
Eðx2Þ ¼ ðð1 3Þ mod 28; ð7 9Þ mod 28Þ ¼ ð3; 7Þ
Eðx3Þ ¼ ðð2 3Þ mod 28; ð5 9Þ mod 28Þ ¼ ð6; 17Þ
All previous steps are processed in a secure environment,
which is considered a classified level. Now, we implement the
formula ðx1 þ x2Þx4 on encrypted data at an unclassified level,
such as in cloud-based environment. We add (x1 þ x2) in their
encrypted forms, as follows:
X2
i¼1
EðxiÞ ¼ ð0þ 3 mod 28; 25þ 7 mod 28Þ ¼ ð3; 4Þ
Then, we multiply Eðx3Þ with the addition result ð3; 4Þ,
ð3; 4Þ  Eðx4Þ ¼ ð3;4Þ  ð6; 17Þ
¼ ð0; 3 6 mod 28; ð3 17þ 4 6Þ mod 28; 4 17 mod 28Þ
¼ ð0; 18; 19;12Þ
Finally, the result is returned to a classified level to perform
the decryption process, based on Eq. (3), and obtain the plain-
text result, as follows:
ð0 r1 mod m;18 r2 mod m;19 r3 mod m;12 r4 mod mÞ
ð019mod 28;18192 mod 28;19193 mod 28;
12194 mod 28Þ¼ ð0;2;9;24Þ
The final step in the decryption process is adding all ele-
ments in the resulted tuple over Zm0 to get 35 mod 7 ¼ 0,
which is the correct result if we do the same operations on
plaintext values.References
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